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Abstract
We define resilience as the ability of a system to maintain depend-
ability while assimilating change, without loss of functionality. To
achieve some required level of resilience requires the availability at
run-time of dependability explicit metadata, information about sys-
tem components which can govern decision-making about dynamic
reconfiguration.
This report reviews the state of the art in research on dependability
explicit computing and establishes categories of metadata which can
be distinguished. This is achieved by a survey of techniques for gath-
ering and evaluating metadata, and modelling techniques for deriving
the dependability characteristics of a system built from components
with known properties. From this survey we derive classifications for
metadata such as quantitative/qualitative, internal/external and con-
trollable/uncontrollable, and assemble a list of metadata extracted
from the literature.
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1 Introduction
Network Enabled Capability (NEC) offers decisive advantage through the
timely provision and exploitation of information and intelligence to enable
decision making and agile actions [1].
It aims to enable this by allowing for a shared situational awareness be-
tween UK and possibly coalition forces to improve the timeliness and effec-
tiveness of decision making. It will also provide support for agile mission
groupings, where previously unrelated force elements join together for a mis-
sion and then join new groups or return to their original units when the
mission is complete.
The foundation levels of the benefits chain upon which this all relies are
“Better Networks” and “Better Information Sharing”. System reconfigura-
tion can help with both of these. Firstly as it is not expected that NEC will
depend upon a network infrastructure being in place to function [2], it will
require that the battlefield assets configure themselves to provide the net-
work, altering the connections as the environment and asset characteristics
vary. Secondly better information sharing could be assisted by adjusting the
data sources utilised, determining the most appropriate configurations to suit
current operational needs of the group. Such reconfigurations are triggered
by decisions based upon metadata representing the relevant dependability
characteristics.
Sergundo et. al. [3] define metadata as :
“data describing functional and non-functional properties of com-
ponents, as distinct from the data used by components in the
course of their normal operation, and distinct from the code that
implements component services.”
Our motivating scenario involves coalition forces working to prevent a ter-
rorist attack. In the scenario, intelligence is acquired indicating a dirty bomb
attack in a coalition occupied foreign state. The objective of the planning
team is to confirm that the threat is genuine and to intervene to prevent that
attack if it is. The dependability driven reconfigurations in the scenario re-
late to the sources of data used for tracking the vehicle suspected of carrying
the device and specifically the confidence attributed to each source.
After the geographic area of interest is described to the Shared Situational
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Awareness (SSA) application1, it searches for sources of ground vehicle track-
ing in that area. Initially it finds data from a number of passive vibration
sensors and feeds data from them to the personnel coordinating the opera-
tion. These give coarse grained information about all traffic moving along
the highway, however there are many vehicles moving on this day and the
confidence of the position of the target is reduced. Later a UAV enters the
area of interest and the SSA application reconfigures to use the data stream-
ing from it. The UAV is able to acquire the position of the target and the
tracking confidence is greatly increased. The area of interest is updated with
the new confirmed location and heading of the target.
The UAV eventually returns to base and the target leaves the area with
ground sensors. At this point the SSA application reconfigures internally and
begins to use a plot estimating module, which gives possible target position
plots by time based upon the previous tracking data and the estimated des-
tination. At the same time the SSA application starts to listen for reports
from patrols along these plots with specific keywords. Eventually a report2 is
found indicating a vehicle of the correct type and with a positioning closely
matching one of the likely plots. By this time the threat has been confirmed,
a UAV is tasked to the area of the last report and the plot estimator, the
vehicle is once again positively acquired and a successful intervention follows.
Parts of the above scenario are speculative, for example we have no knowl-
edge of any SSA application or the details of how UAVs are tasked. However
the idea that an SSA application might select between sources based upon
dependability and metrology metadata does not seem beyond reason.
In this survey we first look at sources of metadata, to establish the ways
in which actual figures relating to a component type may be gathered. Then
we look at how to combine figures for individual components to find the de-
pendability characteristics of the system they form. We then briefly look at
the reconfiguration frameworks that would use such metadata to perform re-
configurations, introduce some concepts from the science of metrology which
are of importance before presenting some classification dimensions which may
be used to guide a search for instances of metadata.
1This is a currently fictitious application used by members of planning teams to view
and share intelligence data and plan operations.
2The report of the foot patrol is assumed to include digital photography of the target
its GPS coordinates, heading and time.
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2 Metadata for Dependability Explicit Com-
puting
In this section we present the findings of the survey of dependability meta-
data. First we present the potential sources from which component metadata
may be gathered, then move on to techniques for combining component data
for assessing system wide metadata. We then briefly look at how the meta-
data may be used before introducing metrology, the science of measurement.
The section finishes with a summary of the classifications which may be
applied to metadata.
2.1 Primary Sources of Metadata
In this section we will present the findings of the survey that relate to di-
rect assessment of specific aspects of dependability. This section includes
dependability benchmarking, fault injection, the use of field data and ro-
bustness testing.
2.1.1 Benchmarking
Benchmarks are tools that allow computing systems to be compared by eval-
uating their performance in some way. A performance benchmark essen-
tially contains two parts: a workload that specifies the tasks the system is
to perform; and a set of measures which are recorded during the bench-
mark. When the tests are complete the system is given a grading on one or
more scales to indicate its performance.
The goal of a dependability benchmark is to allow assessment of a
range of components from a dependability viewpoint. Where a performance
benchmark consists of the workload and performance measures, a depend-
ability benchmark contains a workload, a fault load and a set of depend-
ability measures. The fault load defines the type, location and quantity of
faults that the system is subjected to and the dependability measures record
the aspects of the system considered important from the dependability point
of view.
The results output from a benchmark could be used as the basis for se-
lecting between alternative systems, so clearly the quality of its specification
is paramount. To be accepted by a community a benchmark should exhibit
a key set of properties, these include[4] :
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Representativeness: the measures taken should be meaningful for the bench-
marking purpose and both the workload and faultloads should reflect
the realistic use of the system;
Repeatability and Reproduceability: the benchmark should produce sta-
tistically equivalent results when repeated on the same system and also
when implemented by another party on the same system;
Portability: the benchmark should be applicable to a range of target sys-
tems. It is noted that this requires a more general description of the
work load, fault load and measures, thus this is the opposite of repro-
duceability. These properties must be considered in the specification
phase;
Non-Intrusiveness: A benchmark is considered intrusive if it requires changes
to the system under test, so the points at which faults are introduced
and measurements taken must be considered;
Scalability: the benchmark should be applicable to systems of different
sizes. Rules for scaling of the workload and faultload with system size
can be used. This does not however necessarily mean that the results
from systems of different sizes are directly comparable;
Cost Efficiency: benchmarks consist of three phases, set-up, running and
analysis. These all have costs associated with them. It would be desir-
able to keep them as short as possible, however a thorough benchmark
is also valued, therefore a tradeoff is often required.
A prominent recent project on this subject, DBench [4], studied depend-
ability benchmarks in five separate areas. The full results can be found in
their final report, but for illustration we summarise three of them here.
The first benchmark was of a general purpose operating system (O/S).
The goal was to assess the robustness of its system calls in the presence
of errors in terms of the time to process the system call, the signalling of
the erroneous call and whether the work load was completed and correct.
The results presented included the temporal aspects of response time and
restart time in the presence of faults. A key result was a vector giving the
distribution of workload outcomes in the situations where the O/S did not
signal in any way the presence of the error.
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The second benchmark targets the predictability of real time operating
system kernel response times in the presence of errors. The response times
of the kernel were measured both with and without errors. Results were
presented in terms of the deviation from the average response time and fre-
quency of responses being out of bounds in the presence of faults. The two
figures are then consolidated into a single predictability which characterizes
the kernel.
The focus of the third benchmark were the deviations from normal and
the associated safety implications of the outputs of an automotive Engine
Control Unit in the presence of errors. Four key engine management outputs
were selected to be monitored and the criticality of deviations from a correct
value assessed. The engine was controlled through a “golden run” with no er-
rors, before the fault injection campaign started. The results were tabulated
showing the failure modes for each output, the safety implications for each
and the probability of each occurring, thus characterising the dependability
of the ECU.
Industry research groups are also working in the area of dependability
benchmarking. At Sun Microsystems, Zhu et. al. [5] propose a benchmark
for measuring the systems robustness in the face of maintenance events such
as failed hardware or software updates. Mauro et. al. [6], also of Sun,
mirror part of the DBench OS work by benchmarking system recovery times
in the presence of faults, that is, the time from fault injection to the system
returning to a useful state. The IBM Autonomic Computing initiative3 has
the goal of producing a suite of benchmarks covering self-configuration, self-
healing, self-optimization and self protection. Brown et. al.[7] propose four
dimensions that benchmarks of autonomic systems should represent :
Level of response: how much human support is still needed;
Quality of response: how well it accomplishes the necessary adaption;
Impact of response: on the systems users;
Cost of response: in terms of any extra resource required to support the
response.
3www.research.ibm.com/autonomic
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2.1.2 Fault Injection
The above benchmarks use fault injection as the basis for their experiments.
The basic principle is that a system is tested with one or more known errors
injected into it and the resulting behaviour of the system is observed. While
the nature of the observations made clearly depends on the specification of
the system, as seen in the example benchmarks, there are many approaches
that can be taken to injecting the errors, [8], some of which are listed below:
Pin level injection into real systems: this technique involves probes on
the hardware connections of components, these allow for perturbation
of the data passing between them thus introducing the fault;
Port based fault injection: Modern processors contain debugging facili-
ties which can be accessed through specific Input / Output (I/O) ports.
These can also be used for injection faults directly into the registers of
the CPU;
Run-time software fault injection: this requires that the software under
test is stopped, faults are injected and then the software is restarted;
Pre-run-time software fault injection: faults are injected into the code
or data before it is loaded and run;
Simulation-based fault injection: hardware is modelled at the gate level
or the logic level using a hardware description language (HDL) and is
then simulated both with and without faults injected for comparison;
Hardware emulation based fault injection: the hardware to be tested
is described in a HDL and is then emulated using field programmable
gate arrays (FPGA). This mode of fault injection based testing is con-
siderably quicker than computer based simulations;
2.1.3 Field Measurements
Field measurements are observations made about systems during their op-
erational phase and exist in the form of incident reports and system logs.
They have the advantage that they are highly representative of the actual
operation conditions, work loads, fault loads etc. These data are not without
problems however as firstly system logs will contain much redundant data
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that must be filtered out. Secondly, while many failures may be obvious such
as a stopped process, communication timeouts and exceptions resulting from
illegal memory access, not all failures will be captured these way. It is im-
portant then that all failures trigger detection mechanisms. Tane et. al. [9]
call for software authors to place assertions into systems to turn undetectable
failures into detectable ones.
In [9] Tane et. al. used field measurements to build dependability models
(discussed later in Section 2.3) which are not based upon supplier data sheets
or probabilistic failure rates and so can form the basis for ’no failure’ test
durations to achieve a certain level of dependability.
For research or development purposes, there have been many surveys
performed using field data and also there exist a number of repositories of
failure data. A list of these sources can be found in section 6 of Deliverable
2.1 of the Amber project [8]
2.1.4 Robustness Testing
Robustness testing is similar in intent to fault injection in that a system is
tested with some introduced erroneous state and the resulting behaviour is
observed. While in fault injection, faults can be introduced “within” the
system, for example bit flips in the system memory, robustness testing only
involves the public interface of the system. In particular robustness testing
focuses on the system behaviour under exceptional and stressful conditions
[8].
Tool support exists to help generate the fault loads used in testing based
upon interface specifications. Examples include Fuzz [10], which generates
random inputs for the system and Riddle[11] and Ballista [12] which generate
inputs from the boundaries and outside the valid range of input values.
The results of such testing can be categorised using the C.R.A.S.H.
severity scale [13] :
Catastrophic: when the OS itself becomes corrupted or the machine crashed
and reboots;
Restart: the system being tested never returns control to the user / caller;
Abort: failures that result in abnormal termination;
Silent: the system returns no indication of error or exceptional condition;
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Hindering: when the error response does not correctly identify the error,
making recovery more difficult.
2.2 Security
In the previous section we discussed sources of metadata with a distinct bias
towards the reliability / availability side. Security is clearly a key concern in
military communication and as such is deserving of a section in itself.
In the literature covered, which does not claim to be a complete survey of
relevant security concepts, a number of areas pertinent to NEC were found.
These will now be described in terms of their key concepts and the metadata,
both express and implied, they require. Where possible the sources of this
metadata will be given.
Perhaps the most obvious aspect of security is that of access control, in-
deed Avizienis et. al. [14] define security as consisting of “confidentiality, in-
tegrity, and availability” where confidentiality is “the absence of unauthorized
disclosure of information”. Access control then is the process of determining
if a component or agent is allowed to access a piece of data. At their simplest
level, access control systems associate both the requested data package and
the requesting agent with security level metadata, then if the security level of
the requester is equal to or greater than the level of the data, access will be
granted. Multilevel security works on exactly this principle, however recent
work has moved towards more flexible means of access control to account for
a dynamic environment where agents may access data across organisational
boundaries. Schemes such as the one presented by Srivatsa et. al. [15] in-
troduce a trust metadata into the arena. Here the principle is that an agent
wishing to access data purchases a key from a trust authority, where the cost
of the required key is a function of the agent’s declared trust score (r). The
agent holding the desired data applies a required trust score (R) on the data,
which is then encrypted such that it can only be decrypted by agents with
r ≤ R. The costing function is such that an agent is incentivised to declare
an honest trust score. This mechanism relies on agents having a public image
that they will be motivated to protect, it also relies on mechanisms to feed
into the trust scores one may apply to another.
Other work by Cheng et. al. [16], also based upon an economic model,
sees data items being given metadata based upon the estimated damage if
that data were leaked into the environment. When an agent requests a piece
of data a quantified risk measurement is made by multiplying the estimated
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damage by the likelihood of that data being leaked4. Three situations can
then occur. Firstly the risk measurement is below the organisations soft
boundary, in which case the access is allowed. The risk could be above
the organisations hard boundary in which case the access is denied. In the
case that it falls in between the soft and hard boundaries the agent’s data
acquisition budget becomes important. If the user has sufficient credit to
cover the difference between the soft boundary and the risk measure, the
access is allowed, otherwise it is denied. This allows the organisation to
manage its risk of data leakage by altering the values of the soft and hard
boundaries and also the rate at which users are issued credit.
Access control is not the only aspect that appears in the literature, au-
thenticity of data is also of importance certainly within a dynamic environ-
ment where previously unknown agents enter the network and where it may
be possible to inject false data onto the network. Metadata is required then
to prove the provenance of data. Gennaro et. al. [17] propose a method
where data is authenticated by associating a trusted RSA signature with it.
Importantly the generation of the key does not rely upon a single trusted
authority, instead agents have fragments of a key with which they compute
a fragment of the RSA signature. A public combination function is used to
construct the whole signature from the fragments supplied by the agents. It
is termed a threshold system as a minimum number of agents must all, inde-
pendently, agree that a message is authentic before the complete signature
can be constructed. In such a system the key fragments, threshold value and
RSA signatures could all constitute metadata.
Related to this scheme is the work of Balfe and Reidt [18] which acknowl-
edges that agents may be compromised or faulty in which case their ability
to sign data should be rescinded. The work presents a number of strategies
that may be employed with a network of agents with respect to deciding if
another agents key is to be deactivated, an act which is effectively a reconfig-
uration. They also present a number of factors which could be instrumental
in determining if a key is to be deactivated, these factors could be termed
metadata. Internal factors to an agent include its observations of the other
agent, an estimate of its consequences and rewards resulting from the deacti-
4The risk is a function of two factors. First the agent’s security clearance level, where a
higher level indicates reduced risk. Second, the subject areas the agent normally requests
and the subject area of the data requested, if these differ then there is a raised risk of
leakage.
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vation of the other agent and its disposition towards risks5. External factors
an agent may consider are recommendations (reputations), the time scales
within which the decision must be made and the value of the node to the
network.
Murdoch et. al. state that the use of MANETs will inevitably lead to
information leaking into the environment [19], given this it is important that
we are able to assess the network with respect to its vulnerabilities. In their
paper the authors propose a method for the vulnerability assessment of of the
network. The first step is to determine who may be attempting to aggregate
information, what sources of information are available to them and what may
they want to do with that data. The latter part is important as it helps to
build a model of the value of a piece of data to the adversary. The network
itself is also examined with respect to the sources of data it contains and
the properties of the data they provide, such as the criticality and time to
obsolescence. These metadata are use to construct two mappings, the first
between information sources and adversary data needs, the second between
leak risks and the adversary’s ability to exploit them. These mappings can
then be used to guide security risk mitigation actions. This work ties in with
the security assessment using coloured Petri nets, shown later in section 2.3.2.
2.3 System Evaluation
The methods presented in this section are not strictly sources of metadata as
they do not directly involve the measurement of any system characteristics.
They do however allow the approximation of dependability characteristics of
systems constructed using components with known attributes, these results
could be thought of as derived metadata. We now present our findings in
this area.
2.3.1 Static Models
Fault Trees
Fault trees [20] are a deductive top down approach to analysing a system.
The process starts with the identification of an undesirable event in the
system. Then, using the appropriate system knowledge, the events which
5A more complete list of these metadata are included in the “Metadata Examples”
annex which can be found in Appendix 7.1
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cause the problem, either singly or in concert with others are identified. The
relationships between the causing events are represented using a Boolean
logic, which can be shown graphically using the standard logic “And” and
“Or” gates.
Figure 1: Logic Gates
For example if the event “Fail” can be caused by event “A” on its own
or by “B” and “C” occurring together, then this can be represented by the
tree shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2: An Example Fault Tree Diagram
When the required fault trees are constructed it is possible to calculate the
probability of the undesirable event occurring by combing the probabilities
of the events which cause it occurring. The following two equations show
how to calculate the combined probabilities for both the AND and OR gates
shown in Figure 1.
AND gate: Prob(o) = Prob(i1) ∗ Prob(i2)
OR gate: Prob(o) = 1− (1− Prob(i1)) ∗ (1− Prob(i2))
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A fault tree, when constructed may hide important information in its
complexity. Reducing the tree to its “minimal cut sets” will help to reveal
weaknesses in the design, such as a critical component. For example the
system represented in Figure 3 can be reduced to the minimal cut set shown
in Figure 4, where it is more clear that failure “C” can directly cause the
system to fail and thus represents a single point of failure.
Figure 3: An Example Fault Tree Diagram
Figure 4: A minimal cut set of the tree shown in Figure 3
Binary Decision Diagrams
Binary decision diagrams (BDD) are acyclic graphs that can be used to
represent the failure behaviour of a system in a similar manner to fault trees.
These diagrams consist of a number of paths leading from a root node to
either a “1” terminal node, indicating system failure, or a “0” node indicating
13
Figure 5: On the left, a fault tree with four possible fault events [A, B, C, D].
On the right the same system represented as a Binary Decision Diagram. Note
the left branch from a node is the failure branch, the right hand is the success
branch.
system success. To illustrate this an example from Prescott and Andrews [21]
is shown in Figure 5.
Each node on a diagram is given a probability of both success and failure.
To quantify the the resulting probability of failure for the system each path
leading to a “1” is traced and the probability of following that path computed.
The total probability of failure is then found by summing the individual path
probabilities.
Prescott and Andrews recently presented a method using BDDs to com-
pute the probability of success of multi-platform multi-phased missions [21].
Their approach requires that BDDs exist for each platform and each phase
of their individual missions. These are concatenated to produce a BDD that
represents the overall mission. To illustrate this method consider the follow-
ing simplified6 example that uses two aircraft to perform a mission, Figure
6. The first aircraft, X, is responsible for performing a strike on a target, its
mission is split into three phases, Figure 7 :
• X1: A long range cruise to the target area requiring in flight refuelling.
There are two tankers that may provide this service, A and B repre-
sent the failure events where each of the tankers is unavailable when
required;
• X2: The strike on the target. Two failures can occur here, the aircraft
may nor receive up to date targeting data or the weapon itself may fail,
these are represented by C and D respectively.
6Simplified here means that only a few illustrative failure modes are included.
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Figure 6: On the left we see the routes taken to the objective by both units along
with their labeled mission phases. On the right we see a mission time line with
the mission phases
Figure 7: The BDDs representing mission phases X1, X2 and X3 for the strike
aircraft
• X3: The return to base. Here the likelihood of interception is repre-
sented by H.
The second aircraft, Y a UAV, has the task of gathering up to date target
information, its mission is split into two phases, Figure 8
• Y1: The UAV flies to the target site and gathers surveillance data.
The first two failures that may occur relate to the control of the UAV.
E indicates a failure of the automatic target location and F indicates
failure of the backup manual target location, only one of these needs
to work for the phase to complete. A failure to gather the required
surveillance data, represented by G, is the final way this phase could
fail.
• Y2: The return to the base. Here the likelihood of interception is
represented by I.
To compute the probability of complete success of this mission it is nec-
essary to concatenate all the individual mission phase models, attaching the
root of a model to the final success branch of the preceding model. Figure 9
shows the complete concatenated model, all paths leading to the final success
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Figure 8: The BDD representing mission phased Y1 and Y2 for the UAV
Figure 9: The BDD representing both units achieving their objectives and re-
turning to base
branch are traced and the probabilities for each are summed to give the total
probability of success for the mission.
Reliability Block Diagrams
Reliability block diagrams (RBD) are a graph-based means for describing
how components affect the resulting system reliability [22]. In this method
components, represented by the blocks, are placed on the graph and con-
nected to represent the flow of correct service. This means that if correct
service depends on all components being functional, the blocks are positioned
in series (if one fails there is no complete path). If however there is redun-
dancy in the system, then the components are placed in parallel (if one fails
there may still be another path through the graph), see Figure 10. The reli-
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ability of the two arrangements can be calculated as follows (where R.Cx =
reliability of component Cx ):
Series: Combined reliability = R.Cs1 ∗R.Cs2 ∗R.Cs3
Parallel: Combined reliability = 1− (1−R.Cp1)∗ (1−R.Cp2)∗ (1−R.Cp3))
Figure 10: Two RBDs. The left hand showing three components with no redun-
dancy and the right hand showing three components with redundancy
Of course systems have varying degrees of redundancy in different parts.
Figure 11 shows a system with both parallel and serial elements.
Figure 11: A RBD showing a system with redundancy implemented in the sub-
systems C1 and C2, but where failure of either of those systems would cause a
system failure.
The resulting reliability of the system can be calculated as follows :
R.C11 = R.Cs2 ∗R.Cs3
R.C1 = 1− ((1−R.C11) ∗ (1−R.Cs1))
R.C2 = 1− ((1−R.Cp1) ∗ (1−R.Cp2) ∗ (1−R.Cp3))
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R.System = R.C1 ∗R.C2
Models can be created to represent voting schemes and other resilience
mechanisms.
While this type of model is easy to read, it is static in that it assumes the
dependability of each component is independent of others in the system. Re-
cent work has begun to extend this type of model to include interdependence
using state based models [23].
2.3.2 State Based Models
Both the reliability block diagrams and fault trees assume that the elements
they represent are stochastically independent, which for many practical sit-
uations does not hold [24]. For example different repair priorities may be
applied to different elements within a system. State based models help us to
represent such features.
Petri Nets
According to the AMBER project [8], Petri Nets, in their various forms,
are commonly used in dependability modeling. In their simplest form they
consist of three element types :
Places: these represent the states the system can occupy, such as a compo-
nent being available or not;
Transitions: these represent the events that cause the system to move from
one state to another, such as a component being repaired;
Markers: these represent the actual state of the system at some point in
time;
Each transition has one or more input places (places with arcs that point
to the transition) and one or more output places (places with arcs pointing to
them from the transition). The behaviour of the Petri net is that whenever
all of a transition’s input places have a token it is able to fire. When firing, a
transition consumes one token from each input place and places one in each
of its output places. If more than one transition is enabled at any one time
it is non-deterministic as to which is chosen.
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The locations of the markers at any point in time are known as the mark-
ing. This type of model can check for properties such as liveness of the
system (are there always enabled transitions) and reachability (can a partic-
ular marking be reached by an sequence of firings from another marking).
Figure 12 shows a Petri net representing the working (P1), fail (P2, P3
and P4) and repair (t4 and t5) behaviour for a component that has two
distinct failure modes. P3 may represent a detected failure and P4 could
represent undetected failure. This means that t4 would represent the mean
time to repair and t5 the time to the next planned maintenance of the com-
ponent.
Figure 12: An example Petri net representing fail / repair behaviour of a com-
ponent
Coloured Petri Nets
In standard Petri Nets it is not possible to distinguish between markers, the
Coloured Petri Net (CPN) variant changes this by adding the following :
Colours: tokens are now allowed to carry items of data with them;
Guards: transitions can have conditional statements acting on the tokens
and colours in their input places, these determine whether a transition
is enabled or not;
Expressions: these allow the values stored in the tokens to be manipulated
when the transition fires and enable the determination of which output
places receive tokens.
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Figure 13: An example CPN, with a guard on the transition that the ID of the
the left hand token is “a”. The transition produces a single token with an ID
and the multiple of the two input values.
Coloured Petri Nets (Figure 13) then can be used to evaluate properties
of the system they represent, such as reliability, security, time efficiency and
resource efficiency. Fukuzawa and Saeki [25] provide a number of these pat-
terns two of which are represented in Figures 14 and 15. The first shows a
pattern that may be used to evaluate the risks associated with moving data
around a network, with an accumulated risk value attached to each token
representing a data item7. The second pattern can be used to evaluate the
risks associated with holding a data item in either a filestore or memory. One
weakness of this second pattern is that the accumulated risk is only updated
when the data item is removed from the store. This could be acceptable when
assessing a proposed design but would need modifying to allow the accumu-
lated risk to be evaluated with the data in situ for the purposes monitoring
and controlling an actual system.
7The original pattern described by Fukuzawa and Seaki had a “Security value” asso-
ciated with the token, however the meaning of this is not clear so it was renamed the
“accumulated risk”.
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Figure 14: CPN pattern to evaluate security of data on a network. Accumulated
risk, r, is updated for a data item when it traverses the network
Figure 15: CPN pattern to evaluate risk due to storage of data. Accumulated
risk, r, is updated when data leaves a data store
There are other variations of Petri Nets, for example Stochastic Petri
Nets, Stochastic Reward Nets and Generalized Stochastic Petri Nets[24]. The
tool DEEM [26] uses deterministic stochastic Petri nets to model multiphased
systems to analyse the probability of mission success from a dependability
point of view. This is a prognostic approach similar in intent to that described
by Prescott and Andrews [21] with the main difference being the use of Petri
nets instead of BDD. This approach uses two Petri nets, a system net that
represents the failure / repair behaviour of the components and a phase
net that represents the phases of the mission. These are linked by defining
predicates in each net that are able to modify parameters of the other. This
Petri net approach is more computationaly expensive than the BDD approach
but it will allow component dependancies to be modelled, such as an increased
CPU load leading to early failure and also allowing for component repairs.
In coloured Petri nets values can be calculated during transition firing,
as shown in Figure 13. In other types of Petri Net reward rate functions are
important if a net is to evaluate properties such as availability. For example,
if a system has two communication channels “a” and “b” and the Petri net
for each has two places “a-ok”, “b-ok”, “a-fail” and “b-fail” indicating if they
are ok or have failed, the reward rate function [24] then may look like :
if (a-fail
∧
b-fail) return 0
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else if (a-fail
∧
b-ok)
∨
(a-ok
∧
b-fail) return 0.5
else return 1
This rate function can then be evaluated for the system and a value
representing the availability of the channels.
2.4 Use of Metadata
Our motivation for using metadata is to govern a reconfiguration process.
The reconfigurations are intended to, where possible, maintain the depend-
ability of a system at some level. Several works exist in this area [27, 28]
which share some common concepts.
All the works surveyed require that metadata is obtained about the sys-
tem under their control, however, beyond the requirement that the system
provides probes [27] to allow the gathering of this data no mention is made
about how or what to measure. The particular issue of gathering the runtime
data was conspicuous by its absence in the literature surveyed.
The frameworks all contain some kind of reconfiguration management.
This can be roughly split into policies and constraints. The policies deter-
mine possible reconfiguration approaches to correcting a situation where the
system is not meeting one or more of its dependability requirements.
The reconfiguration process can be seen as consisting of four steps: de-
termining the need to reconfigure; generation of candidate configurations;
selection of a configuration to adopt and implementing the new configura-
tion in the running system. The techniques we have presented assist with
the first and third steps in this process. Firstly by allowing the assessment
of what in dependability terms the existing components and systems can
achieve through benchmarking and field data analysis. Secondly they allow
prognosis of how well a new configuration may perform using static and state
based models. It should be noted that the latter technique is not suitable for
safety analysis due to the problem of state space explosion [29] .
The policies governing the reconfiguration process may focus on one or
more of the above steps. Initially we require policies to determine if re-
configuration is required (system metadata is outside acceptable bounds),
desired (system behaviour is not optimal but is within acceptable bounds)
or not required.
If the need to reconfigure is identified then a policy for generating the can-
didate configurations is invoked. Such polices can be supported by Blueprints
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[30, 31] that represent both the hard and soft constraints that a candidate
configuration should respect. The Blueprint model divides the concerns into
several areas each with their own focus :
Software Blueprint: software requirements in terms of resources, schedul-
ing and communications;
Hardware Blueprint: resources provided by hardware in terms of commu-
nications, memory, processor type and speed;
Configuration Blueprint: how the hardware and software applications
can be physically and logically connected;
Mapping Rules: optimisation rules for the above Blueprints;
System Blueprint: the resulting configuration that could be implemented
on a target system
These then provide the constraints that a policy for generating alterna-
tives can use to determine if a candidate is valid or not [32].
The constraints alone do not produce a candidate solution to a problem
and a means for searching the solution space is required. Montano and Mc-
Dermid [33, 34] have demonstrated an environment that, given the required
run-time metadata and constraints, is able to produce a candidate solution.
The environment is based upon constraint programming and allows the con-
straints to be given weightings, for example task scheduling is more important
than operator preferences which in turn outweigh mission objectives. This
prevents an operator decision from resulting in an unschedulable configura-
tion but does allow the overriding of mission goals.
Unless there is only a single candidate solution generated then a choice
must be made of which to adopt. If this process is to be fully automated
then a policy will be required and it may have to make decisions in the
presence of multiple parameters. Baker [35] discusses this problem in the
context of quality of service. The goal of a decision process is to be able to
rank possibilities in order of preference such that the most attractive may be
chosen. One desirable approach to this is to combine the different parameters
into a single value, which can then be ranked, however the problem then is
producing a satisfactory function to perform the combination. Baker [35]
describes three methods that may be used in such a situation, the Weighted
Additive Method, Enumerated Scoring and Lexicographic Criteria Analysis.
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The approach adopted by Montano and McDermid acknowledges that the
operator may have knowledge about current situation not available to the
computer. Their environment allows the generation of a candidate solution
to be interactive. Proposed reconfiguration options are presented to the
operator who is then allowed to choose between them. A recognised challenge
is how to translate low-level explanations into human-friendly information
[36].
Policies may differ in their monitoring scope, Nicholson [30] describes four
levels to represent this. Component health monitoring is responsible for
monitoring at the component / software level, including deviation of values
etc. Module health monitoring is concerned with non functional issues
i.e. the communications and data flows between modules. Partition health
monitoring focuses on specific functional violations at the application level.
Finally global health monitoring monitors performance and trends and
provides error logging to the other levels.
Also policies should have an explicit authority, Nicholson again defines
four levels [30]. With full authority the system carries out monitoring,
fault detection and analysis and has the authority to shut down components
and initiate reconfiguration actions. Semi authority allows the system to
carry out monitoring, fault detection and analysis, but now it simply reports
the deviations and suggested actions to an operator. At the maintenance
level the system provides monitoring, fault detection and analysis for main-
tenance purposes. Finally with no authority the system simply monitors
and detects faults for later analysis.
Reconfiguration policies are also not limited to availability / reliabil-
ity type attributes or those related to security. Alexander and Hall-May
[37, 38, 39] tackle the problem of producing policies that capture the safety
requirements of a system. Their approach starts with Failure Mode Effects
and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) and produces a hierarchically structured
safety policy where the high level goals are decomposed via strategies into
more specific goals, which may then be further decomposed. While the poli-
cies presented in the cited works of Alexander and Hall-May are focused on
operational behaviour of the systems, it is not hard to imagine reconfigu-
rations also having safety implications and therefore requiring some similar
safety governance in the form of immutable constraints.
The constraints are rules which the system should respect and that a
proposed reconfiguration should satisfy. There may be times when not all
constraints can be met or when multiple objectives must be traded off against
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each other, work also exists in this area [40].
With a new configuration of components chosen, the changes need to be
effected within the system, meaning that the system must provide facilities
that allow the changes. This may mean stopping and starting the processing
in selected components, retrieving and setting the state of components and
adding and removing connections, among others.
Finally, while the above focuses on self adaptive systems, where a central
mechanism controls the reconfiguration, there are also self organising sys-
tems, where the components have their own policies and constraints they are
trying to satisfy. In this type of system there can be another form of meta-
data, “virtual tags” which are inserted into the environment by components
[28].
2.5 Metrology
In recent times special attention has been paid to the evaluation of QoS
(Quality of Service), with most of the attention devoted to the values output
rather than the quantitative evaluation of the quality of measurement [41].
Also in the DBench project [4] it is stressed that the benchmarks have a
well defined specification which includes details of how the measurements
are taken. Without such a clear specification, benchmarks made by separate
groups at different times may not be comparable. Metrology, the science of
measurement, provides us with some fundamental concepts with which we
may characterize measurements and the means by which they are taken [41]
:
Measureand: is the quantity being quantitatively characterized;
Measurement: is the procedure to associate quantitative information with
a measureand;
Accuracy: originally defined as the difference between the measure and the
measureand. Now, as it is accepted that the true value of the mea-
sureand can not be exactly known, the qualitative concept of accuracy
relates the closeness of the measure to the best available estimate of
the measureand;
Uncertainty: the quantitative dispersion of quantity values that could rea-
sonably be applied to the measureand. Usually expressed in terms of
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a confidence interval, with an associated confidence level. Can also be
expressed relatively, in terms of the ratio of the confidence interval to
the absolute value of the measureand;
Selectivity: the insensitivity of the measuring system to the influence of
quantities which are not the object of the measurement;
Resolution: the smallest variation of the measureand that can be appre-
ciated, but also the ability of the measuring system to resolve among
different states of the measureand;
Repeatability: does the system give closely similar values for measurements
taken in a short period of time, using the same procedure, operator,
place and environmental conditions;
Measuring Interval: the range of values of the measureand for which this
system is applicable;
Measurement Time: the time/cost (resource occupation) required to take
a measurement, the reciprocal of which is the number of measurements
which can be taken per unit time;
Intrusiveness: taking a measurement perturbs the value of the measureand.
A measuring system which minimises the modification of the value
minimizes its intrusiveness;
Compatiblity: results taken separately are said to be compatible if the
confidence levels are the same and the related intervals overlap.
For computing systems, Bondavalli et. al. [41] classify measureands into
two groups. The first group have negligible uncertainty, being static quan-
tities of the system, or countable dynamic properties such as the number
of elements in a queue. The other group have non-negligible uncertainty
which relate to dynamic aspects of the system and involve the estimation of
a continuous value. They also describe three axes upon which to describe a
computing system.
Real-time: this scale has time-free, where timing constraints do not exist,
at one end and hard real-time, which have well defined and usually
quite strict constraints on their temporal behaviour, at the other.
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Criticality: this ranges from non critical systems, where failure does not
imply significant damage through to X critical systems which may be
safety-critical, mission-critical or life-critical where failure may result
in loss of life, property damage or environmental damage.
Centralized / Distributed: the scale is from centralized systems, where
operations take place on a single node which may be broken down to
non autonomous, closely coupled parts thorugh to distributed. Dis-
tributed is described as “a set of distinct nodes, with minor even un-
stable coupling constraints, interconnected by any kind of network,
cooperating for common objectives”.
These axes then are used in Table 2, which indicates the relative emphasis
to be placed upon key metrology characteristics when measuring different
types of computing system. NEC systems certainly exist in the distributed
realm. They also have timeliness aspects to them, as receiving an order too
late would not be acceptable and the phrase “accurate timely” is used to
describe better information sharing in the NEC benefits chain [1]. It follows
then that NEC measurements and measuring instruments should follow the
distributed, real-time properties shown in bold in Table 2.
CE Centralised Unc Uncertainty
DI Distributed Int Intrusiveness
RT Real-time Res Resolution
¬ RT Non real-time Rep Repeatability
CR Critical
¬ CR Non-critical
Table 1: Abbreviations used in Table 2
2.6 Classifications and Examples
There are many different categorisations by which metadata can be classified.
We present here a short list of the categories which have emerged during our
research and during discussions with members of the group and Prof. Tom
McCutcheon of DSTL.
Quantitative / Qualitative: quantitative metadata can be represented nu-
merically. This applies to the vast majority of metadata found during
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Unc Int Res Rep
CE-¬RT-¬CR X X X
CE-¬RT-CR X X X X
CE-RT-¬CR XX XX X
CE-RT-CR XX XX XX X
DI-¬RT-¬CR X X
DI-¬RT-CR X X X
DI-RT-¬CR XX XX X
DI-RT-CR XX XX X X
Table 2: Properties to consider in order to perform reliable measurements on
computer systems. The considerations most applicable to NEC are shown in
bold type. The number of “X” indicates a relative importance.
the survey such as reliability, availability. Qualitative metadata are de-
scriptive properties such as a list of the failure modes of a component;
Functional / Non Functional: functional metadata describe the service
provided, for example, the semantics of service or its metrological prop-
erties and pre and post conditions on using a service. Non-functional
metadata may describe Quality of Service (QoS) properties such as the
expected response time or the cost of the service;
Internal / External: internal metadata describe the components within
the system under control, these are metadata that we can affect. Ex-
ternal metadata describe components and properties of the environ-
ment in which the system operates, such as the traffic on the wide area
network (WAN) between two system components. These metadata can
only be reacted to, not directly affected;
Predictable / Unpredictable: some metadata can be predicted, within
some degree of confidence, before a change happens. For example the
load experienced by bank web server may alter predictably. Other
metadata may be less predictable such as the availability of a previously
unknown service provider;
Controllable / Uncontrollable: closely related to the above but not ex-
actly similar. Controllable metadata might include the power applied
28
to the transmitter of a portable network device, while the presence of
hostile counter measures against that transmission is uncontrollable.
2.7 Ad-Hoc Networks
It is not envisaged that NEC will rely upon the availability of an established
network infrastructure, especially in forward areas of operation. For this
reason the deployed assets themselves will become the nodes of the network
[2]. We now briefly mention a potential solution to the problems of pro-
viding connectivity to the assets which may be found in the area of ad-hoc
networking.
In ad-hoc networking the primary focus is on the data on the network
with less emphasis on the connections between nodes. This type of network
has several measures such as:
Data lifetime: how long will the data be available on the network given the
potentially limited storage and power resources of portable devices;
Data Coverage: what data to keep and what to discard when resource
become low.
These can come together to form the data survivability, which indicates
the effectiveness of the network in maintaining and carrying data. Nodes in
the network employ strategies to increase this survivability, which at the sim-
plest level must trade off the amount of data replication and network latency.
For example, a node generates some data which has a specific destination,
that node may then attempt to replicate (send) that data to as many nodes
as it can to decreases the risk of the data being lost. However by using its full
transmission range it increases the network contention with another nodes
and collision probability. A solution to this can be to reduce the transmission
range, which reduces the contention and increases the chance of successful
transmission, however this may also increase the number of nodes the data
must visit before it reaches its destination and therefore the network latency.
As well as logical issues, these networks are also subject to physical in-
terferences caused by their environment which also should be accounted for
when considering the strategies employed by and dependability of ad-hoc
networks [42]:
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Fading and transient network links : Even with no movement, the links
between two nodes may not always work. At best, successful transmis-
sion of a packet over a wireless network is probabilistic and it may not
be possible to determine the quality or duration of that link.
Communication grey zones As discussed above Nodei receiving data from
Nodej does not imply that Nodej can receive data from Nodei. Three
contributing factors to this are suggested:
Small packet size: As “Hello” packets are smaller than data packets,
they are more likely to be successful, therefore a link in which
hellos are exchanged may not support data transfer;
Fluctuating links: the fading issue above is especially true near the
edge of the units radio range, where a detected encounter may not
result in a successful data transfer;
Asymmetric, non circular radio range: As different nodes have dif-
ferent physical properties (manufacturing differences, battery lev-
els, orientations of aerial etc) they will have differing fields of
effect. This again may lead to Nodei being able to send to Nodej
but not the reverse;
In [42] Cooper et. al. discuss an ad-hoc networking protocol, “Encounter
Gossip”, which is one of many protocols in the literature. These may form
the basis of future work if the dependability of the networking aspects of
NEC becomes paramount.
3 Conclusions
We have touched upon a broad range of concepts relevant to dependability
and Network Enabled Capability. This included methods for gathering sys-
tem and component metadata: we looked at dependability benchmarking,
fault injection, field data and robustness testing. These methods could all be
considered to be static, design-time or at least off-line in nature. Conspicu-
ous by its absence was detailed discussion in the literature of what to gather
and how to gather the run-time data required to drive the reconfiguration
processes. The reconfiguration frameworks hint that the systems under con-
trol should provide interfaces to enable this data to be obtained, however
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the details of how the figures are generated for use in the interface should be
explicit so we can confirm that the same metadata from two components is
indeed comparable.
We also looked at modeling techniques that may be used to derive the
dependability characteristics of a system built from components with known
properties. These models vary in both their expressiveness and computa-
tional effort required to evaluate them. Reliability block diagrams, for ex-
ample, do not account for interdependancies between components but they
can be solved more readily than a state space-based model which requires
simulation. The choice of modeling technique then depends on the resources
available to perform the reconfiguration assessment.
Alongside the reliability, availability and accuracy type aspects, security
and safety should also be considered. Security is of great important in mil-
itary operations and as such the ability to assess the risks of data leakage
is desirable. While the methods presented are sound some of the metadata
upon which they are based appear subjective and hard to state with a high
degree of confidence, e.g. trust score and the value of data to an adversary.
That said, it is stated in [16] that:
“Estimating the value [of data to an adversary] may appear diffi-
cult, but any organisation already practicing MLS is expected to
assign sensitivity levels to information based on a rough estimate
of its value...”
The uncertainty in some of the security metadata then is perhaps inherent
in the problem domain.
Safety is clearly to be considered where ever humans may be at risk. The
analysis presented in the literature is shown as a design time activity with
the worthy goal of attaining certification to relevant standards. The policies
produced by this activity can then be used as constraints that potential
configurations are assessed against before implementation.
The reconfiguration framework papers generally assume that there will
be a number of alternative components that may be used in a reconfigured
system. This may be the case for a system which uses services based upon
the internet, however it seems less likely that in an operational battlespace
there will be a number of similar alternative sources of any specific data. For
example while there may be multiple UAVs in operation they are unlikely
to be covering the same geographic region. We envisage then that the poli-
cies and strategies employed by NEC elements may be more geared toward
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graceful degradation rather than using resilience techniques such as voting
mechanisms.
Future directions for our work include:
1. Development of a framework that supports the generation of policies to
describe the conditions under which reconfiguration should take place
and the potential reconfiguration strategies (e.g. instantiating voting
mechanisms) to be used. The policies will ideally also enable selec-
tion between alternative strategies, especially in the case of conflicting
requirements.
2. Construction of a metadata description language which can be used to
represent both the evaluation of the measureand but also other metro-
logical data, such as uncertainty, to allow for a proper assessment of a
potential reconfiguration.
3. Consideration of the issues related to gathering run-time metadata and
how to effect the reconfigurations in running systems via the develop-
ment of a prototype environment.
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6 List of Abbreviations
BDD: Binary Decision Diagram
CPN: Coloured Petri Net
DSTL: Defence Science and Technology Laboratory
ECU: Engine Control Unit
FMECA: Failure Mode Effects and Criticality Analysis
FPGA: Field Programmable Gate Array
GPS: Global Positioning System
GSPN: Generalized Stochastic Petri Net
HDL: Hardware Description Language
I/O: Input / Output
MLS: Multi Level Security
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NEC: Network Enabled Capability
O/S: Operating System
QoS: Quality of Service
RBD: Reliability Block Diagram
SSA: Shared Situational Awareness
UAV: Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
WAN: Wide Area Network
7 Annexes
7.1 Metadata Examples Found
We shall now present a list of the metadata found, either expressly or implied,
in the literature this report is based upon. This is not intended to represent
a complete list of metadata potentially required to govern reconfiguration.
Srivatsa et. al. [15]
• trust score: how trustworthy an agent is considered to be;
• secrecy characteristics: in essence the security level of data;
• watermarking: data applied to enable identification of leaked data.
Murdoch et. al. [19]
• data value to adversary: based upon attack trees, how important
is this data to an adversary;
• data sources available to adversary: what sources of data on the
network might an adversary encounter;
• adversary ability to exploit data source: given the security mea-
sures, would the adversary be able to act upon data before it becomes
obsolete.
Fukuzawa and Saeki [25]
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• reliability of communication: the proportion of successful trans-
missions;
• accumulated risk of data movement: due to transmission on the
network, the risk that data has been intercepted;
• accumulated rick of data storage: due to storage in specific loca-
tions, the risk that data has been compromised.
Gennaro et. al. [17]
• Data signature: an RSA signature indicating authenticity;
• Size of signature: the number of agents vouching for data authentic-
ity.
Cheng et. al. [16]
• Clearance level: the security clearance level of an agent;
• Normal subject area: the subject area normally requested by an
agent;
• Data subject area: the subject area of a piece of data;
• Probability of leak: a function of the agent clearance level and the
difference between the normal and data subject areas;
• Value of damage: the estimated damage caused by the data being
leaked;
• Accepted risk level: the amount of risk the organisation is willing
to take during operations.
Balfe and Reidt [18]
• Observed behaviour: a history of deviations from correct / accept-
able behaviour by an agent;
• Benefit of removing node: predicted benefit of removing the poten-
tially faulty node from the network;
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• Consequence of removing node: predicted consequences of remov-
ing the potentially faulty node from the network;
• Cost of better judgement: cost in terms of time and resource ex-
pended to improve confidence that another node is faulty;
• Disposition toward risk: is the deciding node willing to take risk or
risk adverse;
• Freshness of information: how recently was each metadata updated.
Nicholson [30]
• Failure behaviour: does the component failure instantly or is there
gradual degradation.
Prescott and Andrews [21]
• Probability of failure in mode / time: probability of failure during
a phase of a mission;
• Criticality of failure by mode: in which operating modes of a unit
does a particular failure have an effect.
Alexander et. al. [38]
• Availability of communications: is there a connection between
components;
• Precision of weapons system: ability to target a specific area;
• Coordinate system reference point: are the coordinate systems
consistent.
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